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Abstract: Previous comparative analyses of gross and net settlement have focused on the credit risk of
the central counterparty in net settlement arrangements and on the incentives for participants to alter
the risk of the portfolio under net settlement. By modeling the trading economy that generates the
demand for payment services, we are able to show some largely unexplored advantages of net settlement.
We find that net settlement can prevent certain gridlock situations, which may arise in gross settlement
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economize on collateral requirements and avoid trading delays.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
In many cases summary measures work as well as the full details. Rather than retaining
the details of every transaction that has taken place, it is sufficient to keep track of a summary
measure—the running tab—and handle all subsequent relations based on this summary informa-
tion. This basic insight underlies “net settlement.”
The process of netting obligations is essentially the same, whether accounts are handled
by a barkeeper or by a central bank. In either case, the job of the manager of the payments sys-
tem is to keep tabs, ensuring that the participants pay neither too much nor too little. For exam-
ple, suppose the plumber, a regular patron at the bar, is called in to make a repair there. It makes
sense to make an adjustment on her running tab, rather than to go through the bother of finding
the cash to make a payment that will only be reversed later that evening. Similarly, it saves time
and bother for the participants in a payment system only to be assessed the net amounts that are
due.
Thus it has long been recognized that, whenever the process of transmitting a payment is
expensive, netting arrangements provide economies. On the other hand, it has come to be recog-
nized as well that netting arrangements can provide a variety of disincentives to proper behavior.
The plumber may run up a large tab and then skip town. In the case of central banks, previous
comparative analyses of gross and net settlement arrangements have focused on the credit risk of
the central counterparty in net settlement arrangements (see e.g., Bank for International Settle-
ments, 1990) and on the incentives for participants to alter the risk of their portfolio under net
settlement (Kahn and Roberds, 1998a). This work has therefore tended to emphasize the disad-
vantages of netting arrangements relative to gross settlement arrangements with regard to par-
ticipant incentives.2
However, most previous analyses have implicitly assumed a “delivery-versus-payment”
(DVP) gross settlement system—that is, a system in which the underlying trade occurs at the
same time as the settlement: the plumber pays for the drink at the instant that she buys it. In par-
ticular, analyses have typically ignored the underlying trades, which in effect assumes that they
are made when payment is made.
In this paper we compare the incentives for strategic default in net settlement systems to
those in gross settlement systems with and without DVP. We find that net settlement has some
previously unexplored advantages. Net settlement can avoid delays in trading that occur in gross
settlement systems. In particular, net settlement systems avoid certain “gridlock” situations,
where trading would break down entirely in gross settlement systems that do not use DVP. In
some situations, gross settlement can avoid gridlock, but only by using potentially costly collat-
eral. In cases where trading requires collateral, net settlement can economize on its use. These
considerations are important in designing effective payment systems.
1
The modeling approach we use is one of incomplete contract enforcement. The usefulness
of this approach lies partly in its realism. When payments are not settled at the instant of incur-
ring an obligation, counterparty risk arises in the interaction between the debtor and the creditor
(and other parties in the system) in the interim before settlement. In a world of complete con-
tracts these interactions would be governed by a customized contract that fully addresses the set
of interacting contingencies of the underlying trades. In the rapid working of day-to-day com-
merce, however, customizing contracts for each trade would be prohibitively costly. Instead, the
obligations created by rapid-fire trading are governed by standard legal contracts, which create
an intricate ordering and reordering of seniority and priority of debts during the course of trade.
                                                
1 Our results on net settlement are related to results obtained in other studies. Below, we compare our findings to
those in the literature.3
Thus the incentives of the agents in the model will depend not only on the rules of the payments
systems but the general legal rules for default and bankruptcy. In describing the effects of vari-
ous modifications of the payments system we will hold these aspects of the legal structure con-
stant. An advantage of our analysis is that it makes this dependence on the legal system explicit,
and allows us to consider, in a rudimentary way at least, the effects of changes in the bankruptcy
laws on the relative efficiency of various payment arrangements.
The fundamental problem of a payment system is whether promised payments will actually
occur and the most basic concern should therefore be the extent to which the rules of the pay-
ment system encourage or discourage the  fulfillment of payment obligations. In our model we
utilize the idea of strategic default (developed in Kahn and Roberds 1998a) as the basic incentive
problem. Strategic default has the virtue of simplicity, facilitating analysis, but it also is a natural
proxy for other forms of incentive problems. The consequence of changes in the likelihood of
default will be a change in the willingness of parties to engage in trade. Thus the payments sys-
tem arrangements in our model’s financial sector will have welfare consequences through their
effects on the model’s real sector.
2. THE MODEL ENVIRONMENT
The economy is populated with a large number of risk-neutral agents known as “banks.”
Initially there will be three time periods, t = 012 , , , which span a single trading day. A bank’s
objective is to maximize its consumption in period t = 2. There are three types of goods: cus-
tomizable intermediate goods of many varieties, a final good, and a third storable good “manna”
which will be used to facilitate payments. (Manna can be thought of as incoming funds transfers4
to the bank, whose timing is exogenous). Each type of good has distinguishing physical and legal
characteristics.
Only the final good can be consumed. No bank’s endowment includes the final good.
However, all banks are endowed in period t = 0 with one indivisible unit of an intermediate
good, which can be used to produce the final good in period t = 2. In order for banks to have an
incentive to trade, production of the final good from intermediate goods will involve a “credit
chain,” as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). That is, banks are divided up into I types, where  I > 2
and there are an equal number of banks of each type. For convenience, we will sometimes refer
to a representative bank of type i, where iI = 1,..., , as “bank i” or simply “i.” To produce a final
good, bank i requires the input at the beginning of period 2 of the customized intermediate good
initially held by bank iI - 1(mod ). Banks can costlessly deliver their customized intermediate
good in period t =1. In production, one unit of the appropriate customized intermediate good
yields F >1 units of the final good, and the intermediate good is destroyed in the process. If the
intermediate good is not put to its customized use, then it has a salvage value C <1 in terms of
the final good.
There is a third type of good, manna. All banks are endowed with M units of manna, which
arrives as of the beginning of period t = 2. Like the intermediate goods, manna can be used to
produce the final good. However, manna differs from the intermediate goods in two respects.
First, one unit of manna yields exactly one unit of the final good, and second, manna is not cus-
tomized, so that its value is the same to all banks.
Since the focus of our analysis is interbank payment systems, we will interpret agents’
trading in intermediate goods as a proxy for any trading of financial claims that gives rise to in-
terbank obligations. The level of abstraction is such that the model does not distinguish between5
trades for customers and trades for the banks’ own account. Settlement of obligations by trans-
ferring the final good will correspond to settlement in central bank funds, and the appearance of
manna endowments will correspond to anticipated, exogenous incoming funds transfers.
In addition to their physical distinctions, different goods will have different legal charac-
teristics according to whether they are attachable in bankruptcy. Suppose that a bank defaults on
a commitment and is forced into bankruptcy (in a modern setting, it would be closed down by a
regulator). If the bank’s attachable assets are A and its obligations to creditors are O, then payoffs
to the bankrupt and the creditor will be respectively
max ( ) , ab a +- AOA ;@ (1)
min , OA b ;@ (2)
where a and b are positive fractions such that ab +< 1 . That is, in case of default, attachable
goods are subject to partial seizure by creditors and are also subject to decay. With respect to the
three types of goods, we assume that final goods and intermediate goods are always attachable.
We will compare situations where manna is or is not attachable.
The motivation for bankruptcy rules (1) and (2) is that in the case of defaults, claims of
“outside” creditors such as a bank’s trading counterparties may have less than absolute priority,
particularly when the bank is highly leveraged. In such cases, a default will diminish the value of
the bank’s assets. Also, if a bank thinks that it will default, it may find ways, depending on the
legal regime, of redirecting an incoming transfer (i.e., its manna endowment) so that it is not at-
tachable in bankruptcy.6
3. DECENTRALIZED TRADING UNDER GROSS SETTLEMENT
In this environment, there is one “round” of decentralized trading. In period t = 0, banks
seek out trading partners in order to obtain the intermediate goods necessary for production.
Each bank i enters into a contract to supply bank i+1 with an intermediate good in period t =1,
in return for some payment in the final good at the end of period t = 2. In addition, bank i ob-
tains a commitment from a bank i -1 to provide bank i with an intermediate good, also in return
for a later payment of the final good. In both cases the size of the future payment is determined
by a bilateral bargaining process, in which both parties possess some bargaining power. Thus,
the payment divides the surplus between intermediate good producer and final good producer,
with each receiving a strictly positive share, implying CPF <<, where P is the going unit price
of an intermediate good in terms of final goods, i.e., P is the promised payment from one bank to
another.
2
In period t =1, banks customize their intermediate goods, and deliver these goods to the
bank that will use them to produce the final good. In period t = 2, after banks receive their
manna endowments, the final good is produced, and barring default, creditors are paid. In each
period, all participants have full information about the actions taken by all other participants in
previous periods.
Payments take place according to the rules of “the payment system.” The first type of
payment system we consider will operate under real-time gross settlement, or in this section sim-
ply “gross settlement,” as there is only one round of trading. In the model environment we inter-
pret “gross settlement” to mean that for payment to occur, banks must actually deliver the pay-
ment (in final goods) to their creditors.
                                                
2 We exclude the endpoints in order to exclude nuisance (i.e., mixed strategy) equilibria in which banks are indiffer-
ent between trading or not trading. The details of the bargaining process are left unspecified.7
A bank’s strategy s over the trading day is therefore given by st = (,,) ds, where t repre-
sents the bank’s trading decision at t = 0, d represents its delivery decision at t =1, and s repre-
sents its settlement decision at t = 2. The trading decision has two components, i.e., tt t = (,) DS
where t D represents the bank’s decision whether to request delivery of an intermediate good at
the going price P, and t S  represents the bank’s decision whether to offer to supply an intermedi-
ate good at the going price.
3 If bank i commits to supply at t = 0, (that is, if it makes an offer to
supply bank i+1 while i+1 simultaneously makes a request from bank i ), then d represents the
bank’s decision to either deliver or not, i.e., whether to honor its contractual obligation at t =1.
If the bank contracts for delivery at t = 0, and delivery occurs at t =1, then s represents the
banks decision whether to settle or default at t = 2.
Below we will consider symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibria for this environment.
Given the information structure, such equilibria can be easily calculated by working backward
period by period through the game. In the analysis that follows we will simultaneously handle
the cases where manna is or is not attachable; let the variable a equal 1 if manna is attachable
and 0 if it is not. Let  1 i d -  represent the intermediate good delivery of bank i-1. Then i’s attach-
able assets are given by
1 i Fd Ma - + (3)
Now consider the incentives of banks to default in period  2 t = . Say bank i+1 supplied in-
termediate good to bank i. If i believes that i+1 will default then i will strictly prefer to default in
turn iff it enjoys higher consumption as a result of the default, i.e., iff
11 1 () ( 1 ) ( ) ii i i Fd Ma a M Fd M P Fd Ma ab -- - ++ - > + - + + (4)
                                                
3 In other words, we omit the bargaining aspect of the game; including it would greatly increase notational complex-
ity without having significant effect on our results. Thus the contracts in this game are promises to pay a fixed8
Above,  P i-1 represents the promised payment of i to i-1. In words, the LHS of (4) equals
debtor’s claim on bank i + i’s non-attachable assets (5)
whereas the RHS of (4) equals
value of i’s assets – payment to i–1 + creditor’s claim on i+1( 6 )
Note that in (4) we must take some stand on what happens in the case of double defaults, i.e.,
what happens to creditor’s share of a defaulting bank’s attachable assets when the creditor is also
in default. For tractability, we have adopted the convention that creditor’s share vanishes in the
case of double defaults; other reasonable assumptions will be messier but should cause no sig-
nificant change in our results.
Suppose that all banks have decided to trade, have honored their commitment to deliver
intermediate goods, and have produced their output of final goods. Under gross settlement, will
banks now settle or will they default?  In symmetric equilibrium, condition (4) reduces to
PF M a >-+ + () ( ) 1 ab (7)
Condition (7) guarantees “mutually assured default,” i.e., banks will default as long as they be-
lieve that other banks, and specifically their debtor, will default.
On the other hand, suppose that bank i+1 does not default, in which case i’s attachable as-
sets are
1 ii Fd Ma P - ++ (8)
Hence if i+1 settles, then i will strictly prefer to settle with i-1 if and only if
11 1 () ( 1 ) ii i ii Fd Ma P P Fd Ma P a M a -- - ++ -> ++ + - (9)
provided we are in the case where default would lower i’s payment to i-1, i.e., where
11 () ii i PF d M a P b -- >+ + (10)
                                                                                                                                                            
amount of final good in return for timely delivery of customized intermediate good.9
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If (11) and (12) jointly hold, then “mutually assured settlement” will occur, i.e., all banks will
settle as long as they believe that other banks will settle. In the case where (12) is reversed, it can
be easily shown that each bank will always have an incentive to settle, if it believes that other
banks will settle. Thus (11) alone is sufficient for mutually assured settlement in this case.
In the calculations above, it is possible that either all banks will settle or all banks will de-
fault at t = 2, or both, depending on the size of bankruptcy shares and also on negotiated prices.
We will first consider situations where mutually assured default and mutually assured settlement
are both possible.
Lemma 1. Sufficient conditions for mutually assured default and mutually assured settlement to
hold simultaneously are (a) that banks’ attachable manna endowment Ma is zero, (b) that the
bankruptcy shares a and b satisfy ba << ½, and (c) that the surplus from production of the fi-
nal good is not too large, i.e., FC /  is sufficiently close to unity.
Proof: Negotiated prices P fall in the interval ( , ) CF. Thus (7) and (11) are satisfied if







FM a F 16 ( 14)10
Conditions (a) and (b) ensure that (14) holds. Conditions (a), (b), and (c) ensure that (13) holds.
Q.E.D.
In Lemma 1, conditions (a) and (c) basically impose limits on banks’ wealth, so that under
some conditions at least, banks have an interest in default. Condition (b) requires that there be
deviations from absolute priority (ba <), but that debtors not be able to walk away with too
large a share of their assets after a default (a <½).
Proposition 1. Under conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Lemma 1, under gross settlement there exist
two symmetric equilibria:
(a) an equilibrium where all banks deliver intermediate goods and all banks settle in final
goods, and
(b) autarky.
The all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium dominates autarky.
Proof: To analyze possible equilibria, we consider the incentives of a bank to deliver its interme-
diate good in period t =1, conditional on other banks having delivered. Suppose that a bank be-
lieves that all other banks will settle in period t = 2, so that under the conditions of Lemma 1,
the bank will also settle at t = 2 as long as it has delivered at t =1. We conjecture that there is
an equilibrium where all banks deliver their intermediate goods and all banks settle. Suppose that
the bank deviates from the conjectured equilibrium, i.e., the bank takes delivery of an intermedi-
ate good, but fails to deliver an intermediate good. Under this scenario, the deviating bank will
have FC + final goods at the beginning of period t = 2, but will owe payments of  PC >. Thus,
if the bank settles it will have final goods of in the amount of  FCP +- which is less than F,
which would have been its final goods allocation, had it delivered its intermediate good. If it de-11
faults, it retains a() FC F +<  final goods. Hence, the bank has an incentive to deliver its inter-
mediate good if it believes that other banks will deliver. Conditional on settlement occurring at
t = 2, if the bank believes that all banks will deliver at t =1, then the bank has an incentive to
contract with other banks at t = 0.
Now consider the bank’s incentives if it believes that all other banks will default at t = 2,
after having delivered at t =1. Under the conditions of Lemma 1, if the bank has delivered, it
will also default. If the bank knows it is going to default, however, its incentive is to hold the
largest possible net position against the other banks, in which case it  requests delivery of an in-
termediate good at t = 0. However, since all banks anticipate that potential buyers of intermedi-
ate goods would take delivery and then default, no bank is willing to make an offer to supply in-
termediate goods. Therefore, in symmetric equilibrium no trade takes place.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 shows that an extreme form of “payments gridlock,” can occur under gross
settlement. Payments gridlock is manifested by a complete breakdown of trade, as banks attempt
to shield themselves from a possible ring of defaults. This problem is a coordination failure,
since it is only one of two possible equilibria;  normal trade can occur under optimistic expecta-
tions.
As noted by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (1999) in similar
environments, the possibility of payments gridlock creates a form of pure liquidity risk. Gridlock
is not caused by any fundamental uncertainty about the value of banks’ investments, but instead
results from banks’ distrust of their mutual creditworthiness. The threat of default by any one
bank can cause a loss in priority of all interbank claims, thereby creating a situation where banks12
find default to be their best option. If banks anticipate this costly outcome, they will extend no
intraday credit and no trade will occur.
The problem of gridlock does not arise if the liquidity of banks is backed by governmental
safety net, i.e., if the banks in question are “too big to fail.” Since in this case the banks are fun-
damentally solvent, a governmental safety net never bails out any bank and hence incurs no
costs, as it simply provides banks reassurance against settlement failures. Clearly, blanket gov-
ernment guarantees of the payment system may be not always be available or desirable. There-
fore, we now examine some alternative means of eliminating gridlock equilibria.
Consider a version of this environment where banks have positive manna endowments. For
a sufficiently large manna endowment M, condition (12) will fail, so that delivering banks will
not default as long as their manna endowment is attachable. Indeed the banks collectively would
be willing to establish a legal system ex ante in which manna is attachable. If such a system is
not established, then by an argument identical to that in Proposition 1, coordination failure re-
mains a possible outcome. These considerations prove:
Proposition 2. Suppose that (b) and (c) of Lemma 1 continue to hold. Then
(a) If banks cannot precommit to making their manna endowment attachable, under gross
settlement, both the all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium and autarky are possible;
(b) If banks can precommit to making their manna endowments attachable (for example, as
a condition for participation in the payments system),and that endowment is suffi-
ciently large then only the all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium is possible.
In a gross settlement system, preventing a coordination failure in settlement requires some
means by which banks can increase the priority of creditors’ claims. One way of doing this is by13
making a large enough portion of their endowment goods attachable, so that incentives for stra-
tegic default are extinguished. In the context of the model, Proposition 2 says that banks can do
this, but only if they can somehow commit to making their incoming transfers attachable. If
banks must credibly commit to attachability as a condition of payment system participation,
banks will anticipate that all payment system participants will deliver intermediate goods and
settle in final goods. Hence in this case each bank has an incentive to commit to attachability,
since its consumption will be higher by condition (11).
In the case of some traditional “national” payment systems, where all participants are
based in one country with a single, central-bank-sponsored wholesale payment system, and
where all participants would be subject to the same judicial system in bankruptcy, it may be
relatively easy to implement this type of arrangement. In such cases, incoming payments (corre-
sponding to the manna endowments in the model) will typically arrive on the books of the central
bank, giving the payment system de facto first claim on all such inflows. In cases where payment
system participants are based in different jurisdictions, implementation of such a scheme may be
more problematic (Bank for International Settlements 1992).
An alternative method of increasing creditors’ priority would be to use a collateral facility.
To model collateral, we must vary the setup slightly, so that some of each bank’s intermediate
good endowment can be diverted prior to trading. Trading patterns remain the same as before: a
bank can only accommodate one other bank’s customization order, i.e., each bank continues to
supply at most one other bank with intermediate goods. Suppose that a collateral facility is avail-
able and that a fraction g of each bank’s intermediate good endowment must be deposited with
the payment system as collateral, before the supplying bank will deliver its intermediate good.
Collateral is only useful if the priority of creditors’ claims to collateral is somehow greater than14
for other assets, so we suppose that absolute priority holds for assets posted as collateral.
4 In
other words, collateral functions in the customary way: if the bank does not default on its settle-
ment obligation, its collateral is returned at the end of the day, but if the bank defaults, the de-
faulting bank’s collateral is set off against its unpaid debt. A collateral facility is therefore an ef-
fective way of allowing banks to guarantee creditors’ priority. Posting collateral is costly, how-
ever, because the payment system does not have access to production technologies, so any re-
turned collateral is only worth its salvage value C. Formally, we can show:
Corollary to Proposition 2. Suppose manna is not attachable. If there exists a collateral facility











then the autarchy equilibrium is eliminated. An all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium remains, but
this equilibrium is dominated by the equilibrium in Proposition 2(b). Proof. With a collateral fa-
cility, in return for delivery of intermediate good the receiving bank must post g g of its own in-
termediate good as collateral against final payment.  In return, it will receive 1-g  units of cus-
tomized intermediate good for which it will owe  P() 1 - g  in final goods, where, as before
CPF <<.
Suppose all banks have entered contracts and delivered intermediate goods. A bank will
find it undesirable to default even when and all other banks have decided to default if
a g g g g b g g FF C P F C ()() () () 11 1 1 -< -+- -+ -+ (16)
                                                
4 Establishing such priority may be difficult in some cases. Under U.S. banking law, for example, it is difficult for a
bank to pledge assets to entities other than the Federal Reserve System. See the discussion in Goodfriend (1990).15
(Note that we have assumed, as before, that a defaulting bank receives nothing from its creditor,
and collateral is worth the salvage value in the hands of any firm. As before, changes to these
assumptions will not significantly affect results. Also note that there are two gC terms on the
right side of the inequality: one is due to the return of the bank’s collateral on repayment; the
other to bank’s receipt of the collateral of its debtor.)  Simplifying, we obtain condition (15).
Under this condition, autarchy is not an equilibrium, but always delivering and settling is an
equilibrium. Under the always deliver always settle equilibrium, a collateral requirement carries
with it an opportunity cost of ( ) FC - g , hence if banks can commit to make their manna attach-
able, as in Proposition 2(b), this will dominate the use of collateral.
 Q.E.D.
Note that condition (15) will always be satisfied for some g Î(,) 01 .
5
4. TRADING UNDER NET SETTLEMENT
In the model environment, net settlement means the following. At the end of period t = 2,
the payment system calculates each bank’s net payment obligation vis-à-vis all other banks. Each
bank’s original payment obligation is then replaced with a new obligation vis-à-vis the payment
system, i.e., the payment system becomes a substitute counterparty.
6 Banks in a net debit or due-
to position then transfer final goods to the payment system, which in turn transfers these to the
banks in a net credit or due-from position. The formal definition of equilibrium remains as
above.
                                                
5 This modified structure can also be reinterpreted as a simple DVP system; however we defer discussion of this
interpretation until the end of section 6.
6 We restrict our attention to cases where such counterparty substitution is legally binding. In securities industry
parlance this is known as “netting by novation” or “binding payments netting,” according to whether both securities
and funds delivery obligations, or funds obligations only are netted. See e.g., Hanley, McCann, and Moser (1995) or
Emmons (1997) for a more extensive discussion of netting agreements.16
A key distinction between net and gross settlement systems is that under net settlement, a
default of a net debtor necessarily affects the entire payment system, making normal settlement
impossible. Hence, a complete specification of a net settlement system requires some rules for
completing (or suspending) settlement and for allocating losses among other banks when a net
debtor defaults. We consider two rules that have been employed in real-world net settlement ar-
rangements:
Loss-sharing Rule 1 (“unwinding rule”). If a bank defaults, its transactions are removed
from that day’s transactions, and net positions are recalculated for the remaining banks, and set-
tlement of the recalculated positions proceeds as in normal settlement.
Loss-sharing Rule 2 (“Lamfalussy rule”). Banks must post collateral as a condition for
participation, and share the losses resulting from a default. Specifically, the Lamfalussy rule calls
for banks to post at least enough collateral to cover a default by any single member.
7
The Lamfalussy rule is the rule recommended in the Lamfalussy Report (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, 1990), and subsequently implemented over many large-value payment sys-
tems. Before 1990, the unwinding rule was the usual rule for such systems.
Under net settlement, the following result is immediate:
Proposition 3. Under conditions (a), (b) and (c) of Lemma 1, under net settlement only an all-
deliver, all-settle equilibrium is possible. Any equilibrium under a Lamfalussy loss-sharing rule
is dominated by an equilibrium under an unwinding rule.
Proof: First suppose that the unwinding rule is in effect. Consider the typical bank’s settlement
decision in period t = 2, where all banks have delivered their intermediate goods in period t =1.
                                                
7 A complete loss-sharing rule would specify rules for settlement in cases of defaults by more than one member
bank. Here, due to the symmetry of the model, we need only consider the situation when a single bank defaults.17
Then settlement will always occur since the net position of every bank is zero. In other words,
there is no opportunity for strategic default, since there is no obligation to default on.
Now consider the incentives of banks to deliver intermediate goods in period t =1. If a
bank i fails to deliver in t =1 but takes delivery of an intermediate good, then in period t = 2,
bank i has  FC + final goods and a net debit position of P. As was the case with gross settle-
ment, bank i ends up with max , ( ) FCP FC +- + < a ;@   F  final goods, whereas if bank i had de-
livered an intermediate good, it would end up with F final goods. Hence banks have an incentive
to deliver at t =1, which in turn automatically implies settlement in symmetric equilibrium.
Thus, in period t=0, bank i has an incentive to contract with other banks at t = 0, as long
as other banks wish to contract. And since bank i can credibly offer bank i-1 a payoff higher than
what i-1 can achieve in autarky, and vice-versa for banks i+1 and i, then in equilibrium banks
will always trade, deliver and settle.
Finally, implementation of the Lamfalussy rule requires posting of collateral, which results
in an opportunity cost to banks. From the discussion above, collateral is not needed to guarantee
delivery or settlement. Hence, implementation of such a rule also results in delivery and settle-
ment, but at a positive opportunity cost. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 spotlights a key advantage of net settlement over RTGS, which is that net
settlement can eliminate gridlock equilibria, without the need for either a system by which banks
can make future inflows (manna endowments) attachable, or for a collateral facility. Net settle-
ment is effective because it de facto gives absolute priority to offsetting claims, since such claims
are automatically discharged under net settlement rules.
8
                                                
8 It is the legal guarantee of the finality of net settlement which is the key to establishing this priority. The link be-
tween finality and priority in net settlement has been noted by many observers. See, for example the discussion in
Emmons (1997, pp. 39-41).18
Another noteworthy aspect of net settlement is that a bank’s membership in a payment
system that settles on a net basis generates a kind of network effect. Consider, for example, a
four-bank, four-type version of the model, where the payment system settles on a net basis. The
fact that all four banks belong to the system generates benefits for all banks, in the sense that
gridlock equilibria are excluded. Hence, a network effect is generated in the usual sense that the
social benefit of a bank’s membership exceeds the bank’s private benefit.
9 This occurs even
though each one of the banks is never a direct counterparty to one of the other banks.
5. CHANGES IN BANKRUPTCY PAYOFFS
In this section we will investigate the effects of bankruptcy rules on the payments systems
we have established. The results shown above were derived for fairly sharp restrictions on model
parameters and particularly on the bankruptcy shares a and b. Lemma 1 requires that these pa-
rameters be set in such a way that there are deviations from absolute priority, but Lemma 1 also
requires that debtors bear a significant share of the costs of default. We now consider the effects
of variations in these parameters.
It is clear that problems with coordination failures will diminish as creditors’ priority in-
creases, i.e., as the debtor’s share a is driven to zero and the creditor’s share b approaches unity.
In other words in this simple structure, bankruptcy rules maintaining strict priority encourage
settlement.
What about the opposite situation, where enforcement of priority rules is further relaxed?
Consider the situation where the value of the creditor’s share b is quite small (possibly zero) and
the value of the debtor’s share a approaches unity. As a increases, eventually conditions (7) and
                                                
9 See Weinberg (1997) for a general discussion of network effects in payment systems.19
(12) will hold, but condition (11) will fail. In words this means that “mutually assured default” is
still guaranteed, but that “mutually assured settlement” cannot occur. Hence if all banks deliver
at t =1, then under gross settlement banks will always find default optimal. “All deliver and all
default” is not a symmetric equilibrium, however, so in this case the only possible symmetric
equilibrium is autarky. We will denote the region of the a,b space where this case occurs (in the
absence of attachable manna) as the region of inherent mistrust, since in this case optimistic ex-
pectations concerning counterparties’ willingness to settle are by themselves insufficient to sus-
tain trade (see Figure 1). Likewise, governmental guarantees of settlement would be of little
value in this case, as settlement guarantees would not give banks an incentive to supply interme-
diate goods.
This situation can be rectified if manna endowments are large enough, and if banks have
some means of precommitting to make these attachable. A collateral facility may also be effec-
tive, but it will require prohibitively high levels of collateral as default incentives grow. In addi-
tion to preventing defaults at the settlement stage, the collateral requirement must also address
the problem of potential delivery failures. To see this, consider the case of a bank that takes de-
livery of an intermediate good, but that does not deliver. The bank then has  FC + final goods
and a settlement obligation of P. For sufficiently large a <1, the bank’s payoff from not deliv-
ering and defaulting on its settlement obligation, which is a() FC + , must exceed its payoff
from delivering and settling, which is F. Collateral requirements must be large enough to coun-
teract this incentive.
Proposition 4. Suppose that a and b fall in the region of “inherent mistrust.” Then, under gross
settlement20
(a) If banks cannot precommit to making their manna endowments attachable, then
autarky prevails;
(b) If banks can precommit to making their manna endowments attachable, then for suffi-
ciently large manna endowments, the all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium prevails.
(c)  An all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium is also possible with a collateralization require-
ment, but the collateral requirement must satisfy conditions (15) and
FC F C () ( ) () 11 -+ > + - gg a g (17)
and this equilibrium is dominated by the equilibrium in (b);
Under net settlement, the following hold
(d) Under an unwinding rule, autarky prevails;
(e) Under a Lamfalussy rule, then an all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium occurs if the collat-
eral requirement satisfies condition (17), but this equilibrium is dominated by the
equilibrium in (b).
Proof: Parts (a) and (b). By the discussions above, autarky is the only possible equilibrium if
there is no manna endowment. If the manna endowment is large enough to guarantee that (11)
holds when manna is attachable, then (a) and (b) follow by arguments in the proof of Proposition
2.
Part (c). If the collateral requirement satisfies (15), then mutually-assured-default condition (7) is
reversed. Note also that for small values of b, then a collateral-adjusted value of mutually-
assured-settlement condition (11) is automatically satisfied for g satisfying (15).
Now consider the delivery stage. Suppose that a collateral facility is in place with a collat-
eral requirement g, leaving banks 1-g  intermediate goods with which to trade. If a bank devi-
ates from an equilibrium where all banks deliver and all settle, by taking delivery and not deliv-21
ering, then at the beginning of period t = 2 it will have FC () () 11 -+ - gg  final goods and a net
debit position of  P() 1 -Î g  CF () , () 11 -- gg 16 . If the bank settles it gets
FC P () () 11 -+ - - gg  which is less than FC () 1 -+ gg , which would have been its final goods
allocation, had it delivered its intermediate good. If it defaults, it retains ag () ( ) FC +- 1  final
goods, but forfeits its collateral g. Thus for a collateral requirement satisfying (17) then the bank
will always be better off delivering at t =1 than not, and it follows that banks will contract at
t = 0. As in Proposition 3, a collateral requirement implies a positive opportunity cost.
Part (d). To analyze this case under net settlement, we note that condition (15) is irrelevant, since
delivering banks automatically settle under net settlement. However, condition (17), and hence a
collateral requirement, is necessary in order to give banks an incentive to deliver. Hence an un-
winding rule which lacks a collateral requirement cannot work in this case.
Part (e). From arguments above, if the Lamfalussy collateral requirements satisfy (17), then
banks will have an incentive to deliver. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 establishes that trade can occur in the case of “inherent mistrust” under either
gross or net settlement. As in Proposition 3, gross settlement requires either attachability of
banks’ manna endowments or the use of a collateral facility. Greater amounts of collateral are
required as creditors’ priority diminishes, so opportunity costs increase. In the case of net settle-
ment, weakened creditors’ priority (relative to Proposition 3) also leads to a greater (positive ver-
sus zero) collateral requirement being necessary to ensure settlement. The additional restriction
on collateral comes from the possible deviation of defaulting without delivering the intermediate
goods, a deviation which was automatically dominated under the assumptions of the earlier theo-
rems.22
In the case of inherent mistrust, Proposition 4 suggests that either net or gross settlement
may dominate, depending on circumstances. If banks’ manna endowments can be made attach-
able, then gross settlement may be able to support trade without the use of a collateral facility. If
collateral must be used, then net settlement will dominate gross: The amount of collateral re-
quired under gross settlement is weakly higher than the collateral required under net settlement,
since the former collateralization requirement must satisfy both conditions (15) and (17),
whereas the latter need satisfy only condition (17). For example, in the extreme case where in-
termediate good prices approach their upper limit  F() 1 - g , the creditor’s bankruptcy share b  is













In other words, in cases where the temptation to default is extreme, a collateral requirement of
one-half (plus epsilon) of each bank’s endowment will guarantee delivery and settlement under
net settlement, whereas a higher collateral requirement will be sometimes be needed under gross
settlement.
6. MULTIPLE TRADING ROUNDS
We now consider a variation of the model where there is a second round of trading. This
modified model will allow us to consider the costs associated with delays in trading and settle-
ment; for a more detailed discussion of these issues see e.g., Kobayakawa (1997), Angelini
(1998), or Kahn and Roberds (1998b).23
Formally, there are now three additional time periods, i.e., t = 345 , ,  (see Table 1 for a
schedule of events in the extended model). Banks who have not contracted for delivery of an in-
termediate good may now do so during period t = 3. During the period t = 4, it is possible for
banks who have not already delivered intermediate goods to customize and deliver these goods.
Production and delivery of the final good (barring default) can now take place during period
t = 5 as well as during t = 2. Consumption of the final good now occurs at t = 5. However, pro-
duction is less efficient during the “afternoon” (in period t = 5) than in the “mornings” (in period
t = 2), so one unit of an intermediate good yields only dF  units of utility, where F
- <<
1 1 d .
The motivation is that trades that must be conducted late in the day are somewhat less valuable
than if the trades are conducted early on. The presence of the discount factor places a lower
ceiling on intermediate good prices if trading occurs in the afternoon, in which case  PF < d .
It is now necessary to extend the strategy space to accommodate the additional round of
trading. Under a real-time gross settlement system, settlement in the form of final good transfers
can occur in either the morning ( ) t = 2 , or in the afternoon (t = 5). Hence, we redefine s as
st t = ¢¢¢ (,,, , , ) ds d s , where t, d, and s are as before. The component  ¢ t  represents a bank’s de-
cision to contract at t = 3,  ¢ d  is its t = 4 afternoon delivery decision, and  ¢ s  represents the
bank’s settlement decision at t =5. Under the net settlement system, there is only one daily set-
tlement, at t =5, i.e., the net settlement system operates as a “delayed net settlement” (DNS)
system, so under net settlement s = 0 automatically. The following result describes symmetric
Nash equilibria in the two-round game under gross and net settlement.
Proposition 5. With two rounds of trading, suppose that conditions (b) and (c) of Lemma 1 hold
for the case where banks’ manna is not attachable. Then under RTGS24
(a) The equilibria described in Propositions 1 and 2 are also equilibria in the two-round
case.
(b) If there is no precommitment of manna endowments and no collateral facility, an equi-
librium can occur where all banks deliver and all banks settle, but with delay.
(c)  The delayed equilibrium in (b) is dominated by the all-settle, all-deliver equilibrium
without delay. However, the delayed equilibrium dominates autarky.
Under net settlement,
(d) Only the all-deliver, all-settle equilibrium is possible.
Proof: Parts (a) and (b). Under RTGS with an additional round of trading, it is straightforward to
show that the equilibria described in Propositions 1 and 2 are feasible and remain equilibria for
the two-round case.
Part (c). Using the same arguments as above, if banks believe that settlement will occur at t = 5,
but not at t = 2, then they will find it optimal to deliver intermediate goods in period t = 4, and
to contract for delivery in period t = 3. Because afternoon production is less efficient, however,
an equilibrium where all banks deliver and settle in the afternoon will be dominated by the equi-
librium where all banks deliver and settle in the morning. Banks would like to try and induce
earlier trading by offering their potential suppliers higher prices (>dF) at t=0. But if the suppli-
ers’ belief is that early settlement will not occur, then such an offer is not credible.
Part (d). Now consider net settlement for the case where there is one daily settlement, i.e., at the
end of period t = 5. In this case, there is no delayed equilibrium since banks have an incentive to
bid up the price of the intermediate good, so as to obtain it in the morning. In contrast to gross
settlement, such bids are credible under net settlement because there is no possibility of mutually
assured default at the final stage.25
Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 illustrates yet another potential advantage of net settlement over gross, which
is that net settlement can eliminate equilibria where fear of default leads to costly delays in trad-
ing and settlement. As in Proposition 2, the key feature of net settlement in preventing trading
delays is its “built-in” assignment of priority to bank’s trading counterparties.
Finally, we note that delay costs would also result if the RTGS system were reconfigured
as a “delivery versus payment” (DVP) system. Suppose that the payment system were reconfig-
ured so that intermediate goods could only be bought with other goods, not promises to deliver
goods at the close of business. Within the context of this model, such activities are simply an al-
ternative interpretation of the collateralized payment arrangements. Under this reinterpretation,
banks would then have to purchase one another’s intermediate goods with their own intermediate
goods, leading to a loss in production, or wait until their manna endowments arrive at t = 2,
again implying a loss in production.
7. IMPLICATIONS
The discussion above shows, perhaps surprisingly, that net settlement can offer advantages
over gross in terms of reducing defaults. Gridlock equilibria that occur under gross settlement do
not occur under net settlement arrangements (Propositions 1 and 3). Net settlement can also
eliminate equilibria in which trading is delayed (Proposition 5). In situations where collateral is
needed to effect settlement, a net settlement system may require less collateral than does a gross
settlement system (Propositions 2, 3, and 4). Gross settlement can be made more efficient if
banks can establish a facility for making their incoming payments attachable, but enforcing at-
tachability may be difficult in practice. In some cases (with the exception of the “inherent mis-26
trust” environment of Proposition 4), a government guarantee would be sufficient to effect set-
tlement, but in practice governments may be reluctant to extend blanket guarantees to all pay-
ment system participants.
As noted above, in our setup net settlement often dominates because it offers an easy way
of enforcing creditors’ priority. By substituting each party’s original payment obligation with an
obligation to a centralized counterparty, a net settlement system can allow for offsets that could
not occur under a decentralized (i.e., gross) settlement system. In other words, netting in effect
replaces a difficult-to enforce debt obligation with another, inherently more enforceable one.
This view of netting is related to one advanced by Freeman (1996) and Green (1997). In
the model they utilize, debt obligations are either perfectly enforceable or completely unenforce-
able according to whether debtor and creditor are spatially separated. Under gross settlement,
distortions can result when some creditors become physically separated from their debtors,
causing them to have to clear their debt through third parties at less than full value. Green shows
that a net settlement system can improve welfare by allowing agents’ original obligations to be
replaced with a set of (enforceable) net claims, while Freeman shows that the availability of free
intraday loans from the central bank will have the same effect. In our model no debt contracts are
ruled out a priori, but all contracts are only imperfectly enforceable. The inefficiency of gross
settlement stems from either the presence of dominated equilibria (gridlock) or higher shadow
costs of debt issue resulting from collateral requirements necessary to preclude such equilibria.
As in Green’s setup, the efficiency of net settlement stems from the substitution of more enforce-
able claims held by a central counterparty for a less enforceable set of decentralized claims. We
can also replicate Freeman’s result by allowing substitution of central bank debt for private debt,
but only in cases where the central bank has prior claim on banks’ incoming payments.27
We believe that the capacity of netting to reduce settlement risk is an important factor be-
hind the historical predominance of net settlement arrangements for large-value transactions. The
widespread use of net settlement arrangements among banks dates back at least to the Middle
Ages (see DeRoover 1948). In U.S. banking history, net settlement arrangements predominated
before the founding of the Federal Reserve (see Cannon 1910) and net settlement arrangements
continue to be employed today. The netting of settlement obligations has also been an important
component of arrangements for settling trades in many types of financial instruments (see Baer,
France, and Moser 1995). And as recently as the early 1990s, most large-value payment systems
in the developed countries were settling on a net basis (see Folkerts-Landau, Garber, and Scho-
enmaker 1996).
Our analysis has abstracted from some disadvantageous of netting systems that have been
modeled elsewhere. A number of papers on net settlement (Angelini and Giannini 1994, Em-
mons 1995, Schoenmaker 1995, McAndrews and Roberds 1999) emphasize the tendency of net-
ting systems to focus credit risk within a central counterparty. Kahn and Roberds (1998a) show
how the presence of a strategic default incentive can  increase credit risk when payments are
made in a net settlement system, relative to a gross settlement system that employs DVP. Like-
wise, Freixas and Parigi (1998) show that net settlement may lead to welfare losses by discour-
aging early liquidation of insolvent banks. Given these drawbacks, the general integrity of a net
settlement system will require risk controls (such as position limits, capital requirements, etc.),
plus some agreement for sharing losses among system participants. However, an agreement that
spreads losses over participating banks can also dilute banks’ incentives for mutual monitoring,
potentially leading to moral hazard problems (Rochet and Tirole 1996).28
As we have pointed out, net settlement arrangements have been coping with such problems
for centuries, through a combination of membership requirements, risk controls such as position
limits, and appropriate levels of mutual monitoring. Our analysis of strategic defaults provides a
better understanding of the prevalence of netting systems than earlier work might have sug-
gested.
Both the analysis above and the historical tradition of net settlement clearly run counter
to the recent changeover of many large-value systems from net settlement to gross settlement
systems. By the end of the year 2000, most large-value payment systems in the developed coun-
tries will be operating as RTGS systems. This trend is probably driven by issues that are not in-
cluded in our model. In particular, some of the impetus for different countries to adopt RTGS
systems was to provide a standard interface for possible multicurrency and multicountry settle-
ment arrangements. Furthermore, the cost of operating RTGS systems has probably declined
relative to netting systems, as information and communication technologies have improved. Le-
gal enforcement of netting agreements is weak in some countries, putting net settlement at a dis-
advantage to gross settlement in a way our model does not address. Notwithstanding these rea-
sons for the trend toward RTGS, our analysis leads to the conclusion that one should not inter-
pret this trend as proof that RTGS systems are inherently superior or less risky than netting sys-
tems.
Our comparative analysis of RTGS and netting systems suggest that some commonly un-
derstood advantages of RTGS systems are only available when DVP is employed. The major ad-
vantages of netting are not necessarily its reduced need for liquidity (although one of the advan-
tages we find is the reduced need for collateral in netting systems), as is usually discussed, but its
greater facilitation of timely trading, and the reduced incentives participants have to default stra-29
tegically, in anticipation of others’ default. When deciding on the design of a payment system,
and choosing between a gross or a net settlement system, these advantages should be understood
and balanced against any central-counterparty risk that might arise in a netting system.
8. CONCLUSION
Our analysis of strategic default in settlement systems has revealed some largely unex-
plored advantages of net settlement systems. By modeling the trading economy that generates the
demand for payment services, we’ve also been able to draw clear distinctions between gross set-
tlement systems that make use of delivery versus payment and those that don’t. Previous com-
parative analyses of gross and net settlement arrangements have focused on the credit risk of the
central counterparty in net settlement arrangements and on the incentives for participants to alter
the risk of their portfolio under net settlement. Here we have compared strategic default incen-
tives in net settlement systems and in gross settlement systems with and without DVP. We find
that net settlement systems avoid certain “gridlock” situations, which may arise in gross settle-
ment systems in the absence of DVP. In addition, net settlement systems can economize on col-
lateral. Finally, net settlement can avoid delays in trading that can occur in gross settlement sys-
tems. Extending this analysis to more complex environments will be the subject of future re-
search.30
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TABLE 1: TIMING OF EVENTS IN THE MULTIPLE-ROUNDS MODEL
Period 0: Banks endowed with intermediate good
Morning contracting occurs
Period 1: Morning customization of intermediate goods
Delivery of intermediate goods
Period 2: Manna arrives
Morning production of final goods
Morning settlement (optional under RTGS)
Period 3: Afternoon contracting occurs
Period 4: Afternoon customization of intermediate goods
Delivery of intermediate goods
























Figure 1: Bankruptcy Shares
a, b shares in region A satisfy condition (b)
of Lemma 1
a,b shares in region B are in the region of
“inherent mistrust”